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Abstract
Background: The inverse equity hypothesis asserts that new health policies initially widen inequality, then attenuate
inequalities over time. Since 2004, the UK’s pay-for-performance scheme for chronic disease management (CDM) in
primary care general practices (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) has permitted practices to except (exclude)
patients from attending annual CDM reviews, without financial penalty. Informed dissent (ID) is one component of
exception rates, applied to patients who have not attended due to refusal or non-response to invitations. ‘Population
achievement’ describes the proportion receiving care, in relation to those eligible to receive it, including excepted
patients. Examination of exception reporting (including ID) and population achievement enables the equity impact of
the UK pay-for-performance contract to be assessed. We conducted a longitudinal analysis of practice-level rates and of
predictors of ID, overall exceptions and population achievement for CDM to examine whether the inverse equity
hypothesis holds true.
Methods: We carried out a retrospective, longitudinal study using routine primary care data, analysed by
multilevel logistic regression. Data were extracted from 793 practices (83% of Scottish general practices)
serving 4.4 million patients across Scotland from 2010/2011 to 2012/2013, for 29 CDM indicators covering 11
incentivised diseases. This provided 68,991 observations, representing a total of 15 million opportunities for
exception reporting.
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Results: Across all observations, the median overall exception reporting rate was 7.0% (7.04% in 2010–2011; 7.
02% in 2011–2012 and 6.92% in 2012–2013). The median non-attendance rate due to ID was 0.9% (0.76% in
2010–2011; 0.88% in 2011–2012 and 0.96% in 2012–2013). Median population achievement was 83.5% (83.51%
in 2010–2011; 83.41% in 2011–2012 and 83.63% in 2012–2013). The odds of ID reporting in 2012/2013 were
16.0% greater than in 2010/2011 (p < 0.001). Practices in Scotland’s most deprived communities were twice as
likely to report non-attendance due to ID (odds ratio 2.10, 95% confidence interval 1.83–2.40, p < 0.001)
compared with those in the least deprived; rural practices reported lower levels of non-attendance due to ID.
These predictors were also independently associated with overall exceptions. Rates of population achievement
did not change over time, with higher levels (higher remuneration) associated with increased rates of overall
and ID exception and more affluent practices.
Conclusions: Non-attendance for CDM due to ID has risen over time, and higher rates are seen in patients
from practices located in disadvantaged areas. This suggests that CDM incentivisation does not conform to
the inverse equity hypothesis, because inequalities are widening over time with lower uptake of anticipatory
care health checks and CDM reviews noted among those most in need. Incentivised CDM needs to include
incentives for engaging with the ‘hard to reach’ if inequalities in healthcare delivery are to be tackled.
Keywords: Primary health care, General practice, Pay-for-performance, Socioeconomic factors, Disparities
Background
Pay-for-performance systems exist in an increasing num-
ber of countries [1–6] as a means of improving the qual-
ity of healthcare [7–9]. Where incentivised chronic
disease management (CDM) has been implemented,
small improvements in quality have been reported [10,
11]. However, physicians, incentivised to reach CDM tar-
gets, run the risk of providing inappropriate care to
achieve performance targets [12], or of excepting an un-
limited number of patients within a system in which
external inspections are not comprehensive and of un-
known effectiveness [2] or widening inequalities through
deselection of patients who are more difficult to reach,
or for whom incentivised targets are more difficult to
achieve [11, 13, 14]. Inequalities in health outcomes, ser-
vice experiences and variations in care led UK primary
care services to introduce the pay-for-performance con-
tract (Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF)) in 2004
[15, 16]. The CDM contract ended in Scotland in April
2016 but continues in the rest of the UK. It financially
incentivises CDM in general practices in the UK,
through promoting creation of chronic disease registers
and implementation of evidence-based care (as mea-
sured by a range of quality indicators) for CDM [17].
Unlike other incentivised CDM schemes [18–20], UK
physicians can remove (except) ‘unsuitable’ patients
from the denominator for any of the reasons given in
Box 1, but because these reasons are seen as being be-
yond their reasonable control, excepted patients are not
included in the calculation of a practice’s achievement
against that indicator. Practice funding is reduced pro
rata for exception reporting, and maximum payment is
calculated through a system of achievement thresholds
corresponding to points and payments for each indicator
[21, 22]. Exception reporting was included in the UK
contract as part of a high-trust system to ensure that
practices providing a quality service do not lose out on
payments through factors outside their control (Box 1)
[22]. Overall exceptions are the sum total of the excep-
tions given in Box 1.
Exception categories 1–3 act as a safeguard against
over or inappropriate intervention, or prevent practices
being penalised for factors outwith their control. Cat-
egory 4, ‘informed dissent’ (ID), differs because practices
assign it to patients who could benefit from receiving
appropriate care, but for whom the practice and patient
have not managed to arrange a consultation. The incen-
tive scheme is UK wide, but there is a difference be-
tween England and Scotland in the way ID is reported:
the Scottish reporting system captures this reason under
ID (Box 1) but English reporting systems include excep-
tions due to non-attendance after three invitations under
the category ‘unsuitable’ [23]. The most recent publica-
tion describing practice-level ID rates in England was
based on a subset of 37 indicators in 2008/9 [23]. The
rate was 0.44%, accounting for 30.1% of exceptions over-
all. The criteria constituting ID in Scotland enables an
examination of rates and predictors of non-engagement
among all patients who are eligible to receive incenti-
vised activities.
Exception rates quantify failed opportunities for prac-
tices and patients to engage in preventative CDM (an
‘engagement gap’) and for patients to receive appropriate
care. Exception reporting is under practice control and
may serve practices’ financial self-interests [24, 36].
After removing excepted patients from the denomin-
ator, practices can receive the maximum payment by
achieving targets for a proportion of the remaining
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patients (‘reported achievement’) [17]. This highlights
the scheme’s potential for a practice to achieve max-
imum points without covering the practice’s total popu-
lation, thereby risking low uptake of preventative
evidence-based interventions among hard to reach
groups who may be most in need [25]. By omitting
excepted patients, the reported achievement may also
mask wider inequalities [26], and examining CDM per-
formance reporting data without taking account of ex-
ceptions runs the risk of underestimating the extent of
inequalities [27]. ‘Population achievement’ (Box 2) is a
preferred measure of practice-level achievement be-
cause numbers achieving the indicator are expressed
as a proportion of all patients, including those who
are excepted [24, 28].
Exception reporting has been described as a quality
marker because high rates can suggest that patient
preferences are being considered [29]; however, quali-
tative [30, 31] and quantitative [17, 23] reports indi-
cate that some practices use exception reporting at
the end of the contract year, to help reach payment
targets.
Patient-level exception reporting data have sug-
gested that non-attendance accounts for one third of
ID, and expressed dissent for two thirds of ID [32].
ID and overall exception rates are increasing over
time, with predictors including increasing age and ex-
tent of deprivation [33].
Systematic reviews provide weak evidence of finan-
cial incentives reducing socioeconomic inequalities in
CDM [32, 35] and health inequalities are believed to
have diminished over time after the introduction of
the pay-for-performance scheme [11, 34, 36]. During
the initial years of the scheme, analyses suggested that
the inverse equity hypothesis (which suggests that
policy initiatives for health interventions initially
benefit people of higher socioeconomic status and
only later benefit people of lower socioeconomic sta-
tus) [37] did apply [11, 38, 39]; however, we are not
aware of any study examining practice-level exception
data from pay-for-performance in the UK after 2009.
Exception rates and population achievement over time
are recommended as more appropriate measures to
evaluate the impact of the programme on health
equity [26, 40]. The absence of longitudinal analyses
of practice-level ID, overall exception reporting rates
and population achievement in the same practices
using the same indicators has limited our understand-
ing of the equity impact of the incentivised UK CDM
programme.
Box 1: Reasons for exception reporting as recorded in
Scotlanda
1. Unsuitable (U)
• Patients for whom it is not appropriate to review the chronic
disease parameters due to particular circumstances, for example,
terminal illness, extreme frailty.
• Patients who are on maximum tolerated doses of medication
whose levels remain suboptimal.
• Patients for whom prescribing a medication is not clinically
appropriate, for example, those who have an allergy.
• Where a patient has not tolerated medication.
• Where the patient has a supervening condition which makes
treatment of their condition inappropriate, for example,
cholesterol reduction in liver disease.
2. Registration date and diagnosis date (R)
• Patients newly diagnosed within the practice or who have
recently registered with the practice, who should have
measurements made within 3 months and delivery of clinical
standards within 9 months.
3. Other (O)
• Where an investigative service or secondary care service is
unavailable.
4. Informed dissent (ID)
• Patients who have been recorded as refusing to attend review
who have been invited on at least three occasions during the
preceding 12 months.
• Where a patient does not agree to investigation or treatment,
and this has been recorded in their medical records.
a If more than one exception reporting criteria are attached to
the patient record, the patient is counted as having been
exception reported for the first reason. Patients with multiple
conditions covered by QOF who do not respond to invitations
will be counted multiple times in that year. Practices may
include multiple exception reasons but the Scottish QOF
reporting system captures only the first reason listed.
Box 2: Formulae used to calculate rates for each
indicator
Rate of non attendance due to ID ¼ ID exceptionsa  100
Indicator denominatorb
Total Overallð Þ exception rate ¼ All exceptionsa  100
Indicator denominatorb
Population achievement ¼ Number of cases achieving indicator target  100
Indicator denominatorb
a Number of patients with each pre-specified disease in
each general practice, who have an entry in their medical
records, of ID as the first exception reason
b Number of patients in each general practice, with each
pre-specified disease, including those excepted
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In this study, we used longitudinal practice-level data
to investigate rates, predictors and trends over time of
ID exception reporting, overall exception reporting and
population achievement in order to determine whether
the inverse equity hypothesis holds true for the incenti-
vised UK CDM programme.
Methods
Data
In Scottish practices, data from the incentivised CDM
system (QOF) are automatically extracted from prac-
tices’ clinical computing systems and collated by the
Information Services Division (ISD; part of National
Health Services (NHS) National Services Scotland).
Data were obtained in December 2014 after any ad-
justments agreed between practices and ISD, made to
ensure patients who were exception reported had not
subsequently been included as having met targets. ID,
overall exceptions and population achievement were
calculated as shown in Box 2. Patients with multiple
morbidities are eligible for multiple indicators, and if
they are excepted for one indicator, it is possible that
they will be excepted for other indicators. For ex-
ample, the indicators cholesterol and blood pressure
control are relevant across many disease domains
and, hence, exception reporting on these measures for
a multi-morbid patient will likely be reflected across
all of his/her relevant conditions. Another example
relevant to numerous conditions was influenza im-
munisation, with patients most likely excepted due to
refusal [33]. If two or more exception codes are asso-
ciated with a patient, the first entered code is taken,
in accordance with business rules for QOF reporting
[41]. Some practices may have more patients of this
type than others, so the analysis included random ef-
fects for practices to allow for clustering of exception
reporting at the practice level. ID [23] and overall
[17] exception reporting rates vary between practices
and clinical indicators, so we included the same indi-
cators from the same practices. To improve compar-
ability of data across 3 years of study, we restricted
our analysis to those indicators retaining the same
definition for all 3 years (Table 1).
We included practices returning data for all these indi-
cators for each year. This enabled an analysis of predic-
tors independent of interference introduced by the
indicator, practice or yearly variation.
Statistical analysis
We conducted a retrospective analysis of ID, overall ex-
ception reporting and population achievement from 1
April 2010 to 31 March 2013.
The dataset for analysis included separate observations
for each of 29 indicators measured in 793 practices in
three separate years (2011, 2012 and 2013), resulting in
a total of 68,991 observations (793 practices × 3 years ×
29 indicators). This represented a total of 15.0 million
opportunities for exception reporting.
Data on the rates of ID exceptions, total exceptions
and population achievement were in the form of the
number of patients excepted from or achieving the
Table 1 Included indicators
Indicator Definition
BP 04 Record of BP
BP 05 Last BP≤ 150/90 mmHg
COPD 08 Influenza vaccine in the preceding 7 months
COPD 10 Record of forced expiratory volume in 1 s
COPD 13 Review, including MRC (Medical Research Council)
DM 02 Record of body mass index
DM 10 Neuropathy testing
DM 13 Micro-albuminuria testing
DM 17 Last measured total cholesterol≤ 5 mmol/L
DM 18 Influenza vaccine
DM 21 Retinal screening
DM 22 Record of estimated glomerular filtration rate or
creatinine
STROKE 06 TIA or stroke with BP≤ 150/90 mmHg
STROKE 07 TIA or stroke with a record of total cholesterol
STROKE 08 TIA or stroke with last measured total cholesterol
≤ 5 mmol/L
STROKE 10 TIA or stroke with influenza vaccine
EPILEP 08 On drug treatment and seizure free
EPILEP 06 On drug treatment with a record of seizure
frequency
CHD 06 Last BP≤ 150/90 mmHg
CHD 08 Last total cholesterol≤ 5 mmol/L
CHD 12 Influenza vaccine
CKD 02 Record of BP
CKD 03 Last BP≤ 140/85 mmHg
CKD 06 Record of urine albumin to creatinine ratio (or
protein to creatinine ratio)
DEM 02 Care has been reviewed
DEP 01 DM/CHD with depression screen
PP 01 New hypertensive medication (without CHD,
diabetes, stroke and/or TIA) with a cardiovascular
risk assessment
PP 02 Hypertensive medication; given lifestyle advice
for physical activity, smoking, alcohol and healthy
diet
THYROI 02 Hypothyroidism with thyroid function tests
BP blood pressure, CHD coronary heart disease, CKD chronic kidney disease,
COPD chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, DEM dementia, DEP depression,
EPILIP epilepsy, DM diabetes mellitus, PP primary prevention of heart disease,
THYROI thyroid disease, TIA transient ischaemic attack
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indicator, and the number of patients eligible for the
indicator. We fitted a mixed effects logistic regression
model for the proportion of patients who met each
outcome across all indicators, practices and years to
determine significant practice-level predictors. All
models included random effects for practices and in-
dicators. Predictors were modelled as categorical vari-
ables and, where appropriate, as continuous variables;
the results were broadly similar and the categorical
results are presented. We looked at all hypothesised
predictors individually and together in a best-fitting
model found by backwards selection. All statistical
analyses were performed with R software (version
3.0.1) using the lme4 package [42]. Results are pre-
sented as odds ratios (OR) compared to the reference
category with 95% confidence intervals (CI) and an
overall P value for the differences between the cat-
egories. Any individual patient could contribute to
several indicators; however, the unit of analysis was
the practice-indicator-year combination so a single
patient contributed only once to each unit of analysis.
Data summaries show the number of exceptions ra-
ther than the number of patients excepted. Our ana-
lysis combined indicators and therefore we report
exceptions rather than individual patients.
We obtained both practice-level and indicator-level
predictors to investigate factors associated with ID ex-
ception, overall exception and population achievement
rates. These factors included the percentage of the
practice population living in an area designated as
Scotland’s top 15% most socioeconomically deprived;
the mean age of the practice population; practice list
size; patients per general practitioner (GP); number of
GPs; mid-points of GP age bands; degree of rurality
of the practice population; the percentage of patients
who had not achieved each indicator in the contract
year; and whether the achievement threshold for each
indicator had increased during the 3-year period
(April 2010 to March 2013). For each continuous
variable, cut-offs were chosen to give sufficient num-
bers for analysis in each subgroup, ideally with ap-
proximately equal numbers in each subgroup. The
characteristics of the practices varied from year to
year; Appendix 1 shows the distribution of the pre-
dictor variables in 2010/2011. We describe the un-
weighted proportion of exceptions for each indicator
separately and for all clinical domains combined [11,
17, 23]. The mixed effects logistical regression model
used the number of exceptions as the numerator and
the number of eligible patients as the denominator, so
the analysis is appropriately weighted according to the
number of patients for each indicator in each prac-
tice. We provide the median, which does not take ac-
count of weighting. However, fully weighted
percentages are available from the corresponding au-
thor on request. Results of dependent variables are
expressed as a combination of all 29 included
indicators.
Results
We included data from 793 practices that returned ex-
ception reporting data for all 29 QOF indicators retain-
ing the same definition throughout the 3 years (April
2010 to March 2013) of the study.
Three-year median rates of informed dissent, total
exception reporting and population achievement
Table 2 shows the clinical indicators categorised by dis-
ease, with the median percentage ID rates, overall excep-
tion rates and population achievement from 2010 to
2013.
Eight clinical domains included more than one indica-
tor: blood pressure (BP), chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD), diabetes mellitus (DM), stroke, coron-
ary heart disease (CHD), primary prevention of heart
disease 01 (PP 01), epilepsy and chronic kidney disease
(CKD).
Over the 3-year period, median rates of ID in-
creased for 18 indicators, remained unchanged for
seven (for which all values were 0 across all 3 years),
and decreased for four (CHD indicators and depres-
sion (DEP), which was dependent on the CHD indica-
tor). ID exception reporting rates trended in the same
direction over time for each indicator within six do-
mains: BP, COPD, DM, stroke, epilepsy and CHD.
The highest rates (>1%) applied to indicators within
the BP, COPD, DM, stroke and CHD domains.
Grouped together by disease, the highest median ID
rate was noted for patients with COPD followed by
DM. Increases in the reported rates of ID between
2010 and 2013 were modest, for example, a 20% in-
crease for the indicator DM 10. The median ID rate
across all practice-indicator-year combinations was
0.86% (interquartile range (IQR) 0.0–3.23%).
Overall exception reporting rates increased for 18 of
the 29 indicators over the 3 years, with decreases for the
remaining 11. The median overall exception reporting
rate was 6.98% (IQR 2.63–13.30%) across all indicators,
practices and years.
The population achievement rate for the composite
of indicators remained stable in each of the 3 years
of analysis. The rate was 83.5% (IQR 75.1–90.7%)
across all the practice-indicator-year combinations.
For those indicators appearing more difficult to
achieve, for example, epilepsy and COPD, corre-
sponding rates of ID were either low (epilepsy 06,
0% for all years) or raised (COPD 10, median rate
4.42% in 2012/2013), suggesting that differences in
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Table 2 Informed dissent exceptions, overall exceptions and population achievement rates (median %) for 2010–2013
ID Overall exception reporting Population achievement
2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013
Indicator
BP 04 record of BPa 0.78 0.88 1.09 1.87 1.79 2.26 91.30 91.21 91.21
BP 05 last BPa≤ 150/90 mmHg 0.96 1.11 1.42 4.44 4.56 4.97 78.21 78.34 79.64
COPD 08 influenza vaccine in
the preceding 7 months
1.85 1.99 2.19 13.76 13.33 12.68 81.51 81.82 82.26
COPD 10 record of forced
expiratory volume in 1 sb
3.57 3.91 4.42 14.81 15.79 15.97 78.07 76.64 77.00
COPD 13 review, including
MRC (Medical Research Council)
scoreb
3.42 3.70 4.23 12.11 12.50 12.15 82.10 81.53 81.93
DM 02 record of body mass indexb 1.48 1.59 1.75 3.62 3.58 3.56 92.20 91.98 91.89
DM 10 neuropathy testingb 2.10 2.27 2.52 6.58 6.56 6.81 86.65 86.72 86.10
DM 13 micro-albuminuria
testingb
2.24 2.47 2.56 5.67 5.53 5.78 87.23 87.12 86.32
DM 17 last measured total
cholesterol≤ 5 mmol/Lb
2.24 2.40 2.63 10.71 10.75 11.83 75.38 74.51 74.18
DM 18 influenza vaccine in
preceding 7 months
2.16 2.17 2.42 16.02 15.41 14.80 78.26 78.66 78.49
DM 21 retinal screeningb 1.65 1.73 1.92 9.80 9.53 9.62 85.30 85.49 85.71
DM 22 record of estimated
glomerular filtration rate or
creatinineb
1.23 1.21 1.33 2.24 2.21 2.23 95.45 95.52 95.85
STROKE 06 TIA or stroke with
BPb≤ 150/90 mmHg
0.56 0.66 0.71 4.55 4.88 4.76 85.71 85.62 86.11
STROKE 07 TIA or stroke with a
record of total cholesterolb
0.85 1.02 1.06 4.55 4.65 4.79 88.99 88.71 89.44
STROKE 08 TIA or stroke with
last measured total cholesterolb
≤ 5 mmol/L
1.12 1.39 1.49 12.68 13.24 13.43 70.59 70.49 70.77
STROKE10 TIA or stroke with
influenza vaccine in preceding
7 months
0.74 1.03 1.04 15.66 14.53 13.79 78.08 78.81 79.42
EPILEP 08 ≥ 18 years old on drug
treatment and seizure free for
past 12 months
1.16 1.92 2.08 24.00 24.32 25.00 58.73 58.62 57.41
EPILEP 06 ≥ 18 years old on
drug treatment with a record
of seizure frequencyb
0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.94 5.00 91.30 90.57 91.09
CHD 06 last BPb≤ 150/
90 mmHg
0.75 0.71 0.64 3.29 3.17 3.33 88.41 87.94 88.60
CHD 08 last total
cholesterolb≤ 5 mmol/L
1.25 1.26 1.11 10.13 10.46 10.99 75.25 73.24 73.49
CHD 12 influenza vaccine in
preceding 7 months
0.99 0.95 0.92 12.90 12.13 11.60 82.40 82.82 82.90
CKD 02 record of BPb in those
with CKD
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.63 0.62 97.35 97.18 97.16
CKD 03 last BPb≤ 140/
85 mmHg
0.00 0.00 0.00 6.46 6.31 6.27 70.97 71.59 72.33
CKD 06 record of urine
albumin to creatinine ratio (or
protein to creatinine ratio)b
0.00 0.00 0.20 3.91 3.85 3.76 83.07 83.02 83.08
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the level of difficulty achieving the indicator were
caused by the nature of the indicator or the ability
of patients to attend their practice to receive the in-
dicator. Higher rates of median achievement ap-
peared to correspond with higher rates of ID
exception reporting.
Predictors of informed dissent exception reporting
Table 3 illustrates the associations between hypothe-
sised practice-level predictors and ID. The table
shows ORs from models for the combination of all
29 indicators, across 793 practices, over 3 years as
univariate analyses and also after controlling for con-
founding variables.
Univariate analyses show ID increased over the 3-year
period, and followed a socioeconomic gradient with
higher median rates in the most deprived practices. ID
was higher in practices with younger populations than in
practices with older populations. Median rates increased
as practice list size increased; practices with more pa-
tients per GP had higher median levels. Large urban
practices reported higher rates of ID compared with
rural practices.
A model-selection procedure identified a subset of
five independent predictors associated with ID in the
best-fit model: year of reporting, practice-level
deprivation, list size, urban/rural practice location,
and extent of indicator non-achievement. The odds of
ID exception reporting for patients with at least one
of the specified 11 diseases in 2012/2013 was greater
than in 2010/2011 after controlling for other predic-
tors (OR 1.16, 95% CI 1.15–1.17, P < 0.001). The most
deprived practices were more likely to report ID com-
pared with least deprived practices (OR 2.22, 95% CI
1.91–2.58, P < 0.001). Practices with the largest list
sizes were also more likely to report ID (OR 1.89, 95%
CI 1.43–2.51, P < 0.001). Significant differences were
also seen with practice location (odds of ID reporting
were 31% lower in rural areas) and when there were
higher rates of QOF non-achievement in the same
year: the odds of ID reporting by practices were over
20% lower in lower-achieving practices (practices with
higher levels of non-achievement). Practices with
higher achievement had higher rates of exception
reporting.
Predictors of overall exception reporting
A model-selection procedure identified a subset of inde-
pendent predictors of overall exceptions (Table 4) that
were similar to those found with ID exceptions. These
included further evidence that practices achieving higher
points had higher levels of exceptions and that more de-
prived practices, urban practices, higher list sizes and
the progress of time were also associated with higher
exceptions.
Predictors of population achievement
Following a model-selection procedure, Table 5 shows
that practice-level deprivation was independently as-
sociated with low population achievement: the lowest
odds of achievement were associated with the most
deprived practices (OR 0.84, 95% CI 0.80–0.87, P <
0.001).
Table 2 Informed dissent exceptions, overall exceptions and population achievement rates (median %) for 2010–2013 (Continued)
DEM 02 care has been
reviewedb in those with
dementia
0.00 0.00 0.00 5.56 5.17 6.25 75.68 76.77 78.33
DEP 01 DM/CHD with
depression screenb
0.43 0.51 0.40 3.64 3.64 3.95 87.45 86.75 86.62
PP 01 new hypertensive
medication (without CHD,
diabetes, stroke and/or TIA)c
with a cardiovascular risk
assessment using approved
tool
0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 12.50 11.11 73.33 72.22 75.56
PP 02 hypertensive medication;
given lifestyle adviceb for
physical activity, smoking,
alcohol and healthy diet
0.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 4.76 3.39 79.55 80.49 82.86
THYROI 02 hypothyroidism
with thyroid function testsb
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.52 0.59 95.91 95.80 95.45
All indicators combined 0.76 0.88 0.96 7.04 7.02 6.92 83.51 83.41 83.63
Data are presented as the median percentage. a in the previous 9 months; b in the previous 15 months; c in the past year.
BP blood pressure, CHD coronary heart disease, CKD chronic kidney disease, COPD chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, DEM dementia, DEP depression, EPILIP
epilepsy, DM diabetes mellitus, PP primary prevention of heart disease, THYROI thyroid disease, TIA transient ischaemic attack
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Discussion
Our longitudinal analysis of practice-level data from
793 Scottish general practices serving 4.4 million pa-
tients showed that more deprived practices were at
least twice as likely to report ID compared with the
least deprived practices (OR 2.22, 95% CI 1.91–2.58,
P < 0.001) and 32% more likely to report overall ex-
ceptions. Of all the predictor variables included in
each of the regression analyses, deprivation was the
strongest predictor (based on ORs) in every regres-
sion model. This result suggests that there is a lower
uptake of appropriate clinical care for CDM that aims
Table 3 Independent predictors of 3-year Quality and Outcomes Framework indicators for informed dissent
Predictor Univariate (odds ratios) Best fit (odds ratios)
Estimated (95% CI), P value Overall P value Estimated (95% CI), P value Overall P value
Year
2010/2011*
2011/2012
2012/2013
-
1.070 (1.062–1.079), P < 0.001
1.155 (1.146–1.165), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
1.073 (1.065–1.082), P < 0.001
1.160 (1.151–1.169), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Practice population: % in top 15% most deprived
None*
<5%
5–15%
15–25%
25–50%
>50%
-
1.113 (1.066–1.163), P < 0.001
1.879 (1.679–2.102), P < 0.001
1.978 (1.760–2.222), P < 0.001
2.075 (1.831–2.352), P < 0.001
2.095 (1.825–2.404), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
1.084 (1.037–1.132), P < 0.001
1.704 (1.514–1.918), P < 0.001
1.770 (1.563–2.005), P < 0.001
2.028 (1.771–2.322), P < 0.001
2.221 (1.914–2.577), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Practice population: mean age
<40*
40–41
≥42
-
0.803 (0.661–0.975), P = 0.027
0.499 (0.409–0.609), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 removed during backward stepwise regression
Practice population: list size
<5000*
5–10,000
≥10,000
-
1.865 (1.581–2.198), P < 0.001
2.162 (1.628–2.871), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
1.639 (1.384–1.941), P < 0.001
1.895 (1.431–2.509), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Practice population: patients per GP
<1000*
1000–1500
≥1500
-
1.393 (1.160–1.673), P < 0.001
1.637 (1.319–2.032), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 removed during backward stepwise regression
Practice GPs: number of GPs
1*
2-3
4–6
≥7
-
0.882 (0.618–1.258), P = 0.489
1.260 (0.884–1.795), P = 0.202
1.641 (1.144–2.353), P = 0.007
P < 0.001 removed during backward stepwise regression
Practice GPs: mean age
≤44*
45–49
≥50
-
0.934 (0.771–1.131), P = 0.483
0.863 (0.699–1.066), P = 0.171
P = 0.392 removed during backward stepwise regression
Practice: urban/rural
Large urban*
Other urban
Small town
Rural
-
0.847 (0.699–1.026), P = 0.089
0.806 (0.632–1.029), P = 0.084
0.342 (0.277–0.421), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.881 (0.728–1.066), P = 0.193
1.055 (0.826–1.349), P = 0.667
0.690 (0.546–0.872), P = 0.002
P = 0.006
Indicator: % not achieved*
<5%*
5-10%
>10%
-
0.914 (0.906–0.923), P < 0.001
0.784 (0.774–0.794), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.912 (0.903–0.920), P < 0.001
0.783 (0.773–0.793), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Indicator: threshold increasing
No*
Yes
-
0.705 (0.381–1.304), P = 0.265
P = 0.265 removed during backward stepwise regression
* Reference group for odds ratio
CI confidence interval, GP general practitioner
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to prevent further disability and mortality for those
most in need of preventative and ongoing health
service intervention.
Rates of ID and overall exception reporting in-
creased over time. High achievement (contract points
and therefore remuneration) was associated with
higher rates of ID and overall exception reporting, re-
opening the possibility of gaming, that is, those who
use the exception reporting rules more often achieve
higher QOF achievement, or suggesting that higher-
achieving practices are more adept at identifying and
reporting exceptions.
In three recent CDM contract years, the year of
reporting, increased deprivation, an urban location and
large practice size were predictive of ID, overall excep-
tion reporting rates and population achievement.
Contrary to previous findings based on the early years of
the contract [11], our findings suggest that the inverse
equity hypothesis does not hold, because practices in
more deprived areas are more likely to show higher
rates of exceptions, implying that more patients are
missing out on CDM opportunities. Our study
raises the possibility that the incentivised CDM
programme, recently curtailed in Scotland but con-
tinuing to operate in the rest of the UK, may be
widening the health equity gap by not directly
incentivising practices to use methods of engage-
ment other than letters, for example, house visits
or assertive outreach. Given the central importance
of primary care, the finding of a lower uptake
among patients with at least one long-term condi-
tion who are living in more deprived backgrounds
Table 4 Independent predictors of 3-year Quality and Outcomes Framework indicators for overall exceptions
Predictor Total exceptions
Univariate (odds ratios) Best fit (odds ratios)
Estimated (95% CI), P value Overall P value Estimated (95% CI), P value Overall P value
Year 2010/2011*
2011/2012
2012/2013
-
0.995 (0.991–1.000), P = 0.062
1.024 (1.019–1.029), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.997 (0.993–1.002), P = 0.293
1.028 (1.023–1.033), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Practice population:
% in top 15%
most deprived
None*
<5%
5–15%
15–25%
25–50%
>50%
-
1.042 (1.019–1.065), P < 0.001
1.178 (1.119–1.239), P < 0.001
1.268 (1.202–1.338), P < 0.001
1.359 (1.282–1.440), P < 0.001
1.418 (1.325–1.517), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
1.035 (1.012–1.059), P = 0.002
1.128 (1.068–1.192), P < 0.001
1.188 (1.119–1.261), P < 0.001
1.278 (1.197–1.365), P < 0.001
1.325 (1.227–1.429), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Practice population:
mean age
<40*
40–41
≥42
-
0.908 (0.843–0.979), P = 0.012
0.785 (0.727–0.847), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Practice population:
list size
<5000*
5–10,000
≥10,000
-
1.137 (1.066–1.213), P < 0.001
1.121 (1.003–1.254), P = 0.045
P < 0.001 -
1.091 (1.021–1.165), P = 0.010
1.081 (0.970–1.206), P = 0.160
P = 0.030
Practice population:
patients per GP
<1000*
1000–1500
≥1500
-
1.092 (1.018–1.171), P = 0.014
1.186 (1.092–1.288), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Practice GPs:
number of GPs
1*
2–3
4–6
≥7
-
0.921 (0.802–1.057), P = 0.240
0.956 (0.833–1.097), P = 0.520
1.008 (0.876–1.159), P = 0.911
P = 0.150 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Practice GPs:
mean age
≤44*
45–49
≥50
-
0.984 (0.915–1.059), P = 0.672
1.025 (0.946–1.111), P = 0.549
P = 0.594 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Practice:
urban/rural
Large urban*
Other urban
Small town
Rural
-
0.856 (0.796–0.921), P < 0.001
0.870 (0.792–0.955), P = 0.003
0.659 (0.609–0.713), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.900 (0.835–0.970), P = 0.006
0.971 (0.881–1.070), P = 0.548
0.799 (0.727–0.878), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Indicator:
% not achieved
<5%*
5–10%
>10%
-
0.923 (0.918–0.928), P < 0.001
0.853 (0.846–0.859), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.922 (0.917–0.927), P < 0.001
0.852 (0.846–0.858), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Indicator:
threshold increasing
No*
Yes
-
1.204 (0.645–2.248), P = 0.560
P = 0.560 removed during backward
stepwise regression
* Reference group for odds ratio
CI confidence interval, GP general practitioner
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suggests the UK contract may not lead to an in-
crease in health status, or not act in such a way as
to decrease the higher use of accident and emer-
gency facilities, emergency admissions and out-of-
hours clinic use seen in patients from more
deprived areas [43]. Practice-level CDM contract
payment mechanisms do not take into account
patient-level multi-morbidity or an individual’s
other circumstances, for example, their ability to
travel to their practice for multiple appointments
[24, 44, 45]. Our data raise the possibility that the
persisting ill health [46] and excess mortality [47]
found in patients in Scotland with incentivised
chronic diseases from more deprived communities
may in part be explained by the lower uptake of
evidence-based interventions, particularly in condi-
tions associated with multi-morbidity and limitation
of daily activity, for example, COPD. Other reasons
for consistently high rates of non-attendance among
indicators in patients with COPD or diabetes are
not currently known. Some possible reasons may
include patient unwillingness to attend appoint-
ments due to the number of repeated requests for
attendance, or the duration of individual appoint-
ments. Transport difficulties, such as the cost of
bus fares, or an inability to secure paid time off
work to attend could also be contributory. Overall
exceptions appeared higher in COPD, diabetes and
stroke, which may be explained in part by the
contribution made by higher ID rates (COPD and
diabetes). Overall exceptions are calculated by the
addition of the four categories described in Box 1.
Therefore, high levels of 'Unsuitable', 'Registration
date and diagnosis date' and 'Other' may account
for higher overall exceptions.
Together, these data provide additional evidence
[48, 49] that the inverse care law continues to oper-
ate in Scotland, despite over 10 years of the incenti-
vised UK CDM contract designed to address health
disparities.
Table 5 Analysis of 3-year Quality and Outcomes Framework indicators for population achievement
Predictor Univariate (odds ratios) Best fit (odds ratios)
Estimated (95% CI), P value Overall P value Estimated (95% CI), P value Overall P value
Year 2010/2011*
2011/2012
2012/2013
-
0.991 (0.988–0.995), P < 0.001
1.006 (1.003–1.010), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.998 (0.994–1.001), P = 0.164
1.012 (1.008–1.015), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Practice population:
% in top 15%
most deprived
None*
<5%
5–15%
15–25%
25–50%
>50%
-
0.968 (0.954–0.982), P < 0.001
0.894 (0.865–0.924), P < 0.001
0.894 (0.863–0.926), P < 0.001
0.832 (0.800–0.864), P < 0.001
0.854 (0.816–0.895), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.980 (0.966–0.995), P = 0.007
0.940 (0.912–0.970), P < 0.001
0.912 (0.882–0.942), P < 0.001
0.862 (0.832–0.893), P < 0.001
0.837 (0.802–0.873), P < 0.001
P < 0.001
Practice population:
mean age
<40*
40–41
≥42
-
1.037 (0.988–1.088), P = 0.138
1.117 (1.064–1.173), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Practice population:
list size
<5000*
5–10,000
≥10,000
-
0.882 (0.847–0.918), P < 0.001
0.881 (0.822–0.945), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 -
0.913 (0.881–0.947), P < 0.001
0.918 (0.863–0.975), P = 0.006
P = 0.003
Practice population:
patients per GP
<1000*
1000–1500
≥1500
-
0.951 (0.910–0.995), P = 0.028
0.920 (0.873–0.970), P = 0.002
P = 0.005 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Practice GPs:
number of GPs
1*
2–3
4–6
≥7
-
0.999 (0.916–1.090), P = 0.983
0.949 (0.870–1.035), P = 0.235
0.908 (0.831–0.992), P = 0.032
P = 0.002 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Practice GPs:
mean age
≤44*
45–49
≥50
-
0.980 (0.936–1.027), P = 0.396
0.985 (0.936–1.036), P = 0.553
P = 0.683 -
0.999 (0.961–1.039), P = 0.974
0.951 (0.910–0.993), P = 0.023
P = 0.038
Practice:
urban/rural
Large urban
Other urban
Small town
Rural
-*
1.045 (0.996–1.096), P = 0.073
1.048 (0.986–1.114), P = 0.130
1.210 (1.149–1.275), P < 0.001
P < 0.001 removed during backward
stepwise regression
Indicator:
threshold increasing
No*
Yes
-
0.617 (0.373–1.020), P = 0.060
P = 0.060 removed during backward
stepwise regression
* Reference group for odds ratio
CI confidence interval, GP general practitioner
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Implications for clinicians
Experience from other pay-for-performance systems
suggests that patients from some minority groups
have difficulty attending appointments and re-
appointments due to problems with transport [50,
51, 53], poor understanding of recommendations
[54] or costs [55]. Our findings underscore that
tailored engagement approaches (e.g. phone calls or
text reminders, or through house visits for house-
bound patients) may be merited for patients who
are less likely to attend the practice [52]. Tailoring
invitations, for example by offering flexible ap-
pointments or using methods other than re-sending
invitation letters three times as stipulated in the
CDM contract, is known to increase the uptake of
general practice-based preventative care in ‘hard to
reach’ groups in more deprived areas [52–56].
While individualised forms of engagement may
require additional administrative time, effort and
funding [45], practices are free to adopt new
methods of engagement because the CDM contract
does not constrain practices’ engagement ap-
proaches. More research is needed to identify
methods to optimise engagement in deprived areas,
given the growing evidence of the unintended con-
sequence of severely ill patients being excluded
from care [33, 57, 58].
Implications for policymakers
UK primary care is seen as having a key role in
improving clinical outcomes, particularly in de-
prived areas [16]. The incentivised CDM
programme was seen as one mechanism for de-
creasing variation in the standards of healthcare
and for potentially lessening inequalities in care
provision [15, 16, 59, 60]. Our findings suggest
there are socioeconomic inequalities in the uptake
of best practice in clinical care for CDM and that
the inverse equity hypothesis does not hold, con-
trary to previous findings [11, 34, 61, 62]. This re-
inforces calls to revise pay-for-performance
programmes for CDM in a way that directly re-
wards reductions in inequalities [34, 63, 64], for
example, by incentivising practices to reach pa-
tients who have more to gain but are less likely to
attend their practice [76]. A revision of incentives
based on need [47] or appointment systems, and
increasing the skill mix in general practice to share
the responsibility of managing chronic diseases
[65], for example, by introducing practice-based,
independent prescribing pharmacists who could
visit patients in their homes, may help address the
increased workload contributing to the underlying
shortage of GPs.
As a result of the higher uptake of preventative
healthcare in more affluent populations, international
health improvement policies have recommended the
use of targeted, preventative primary care [66–68], for
example, using outreach workers to engage ‘hard to
reach’ subgroups [69, 70]. Given the likely variation in
invitation methods and associated successes or fail-
ures, contract revisions could include encouragement
or incentivisation for practices to assess the accept-
ability and effectiveness of different engagement
methods and use the method most suited to their pa-
tients. A comparison between UK and Californian
programmes suggested that increasing financial re-
wards did not address health inequities: a revision of
design and implementation was seen as more appro-
priate [18].
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
We present findings from the majority of Scottish
practices and describe, for the first time, practice-
level time trends and factors predicting non-
attendance due to ID among patients eligible to re-
ceive the UK’s incentivised CDM programme in Scot-
tish primary care. The recording of non-attendance
and refusal as ID for all 29 indicators over three re-
cent contract years enabled us to evaluate these fac-
tors independent of changes to indicator definitions
and to avoid selection bias. We accounted for
changes to thresholds in our analysis, because of the
finding that threshold changes influence exception
rates [71].
The study has several weaknesses. Reporting sys-
tems are unable to differentiate ID non-attendance
due to expressed refusal or when no reason is given.
This limited our ability to make inferences about
the extent to which patients chose not to attend ra-
ther than lacked the capacity or capability to attend,
or did not receive an invitation, for example due to
having moved house. Absolute rates of exceptions
may be conditional on the indicators included be-
cause exception rates vary by indicator. However,
this would not be expected to affect observed differ-
ences over time with the same indicators. In
addition, the UK CDM contract rules only record
the first exception reporting reason encountered in
the information returned by practices, which may
underestimate the true rate of ID. Participation in
the pay-for-performance contract is voluntary, and
there are differences in, for example, practice size
and rurality, between practices participating and not
participating in the UK pay-for-performance con-
tract [77, 78]. Therefore, our conclusions, as with
other practice-level analyses (Appendix 2) based on
83% of participating practices, may be limited to
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those participating in the UK pay-for-performance
contract.
Our conclusions may not apply to other settings,
such as those with market-based healthcare systems
or low-income countries, and we did not consider di-
mensions of inequality such as ethnicity or gender,
due to a lack of patient-level data.
Comparison with existing literature
Median rates of ID and overall practice-level excep-
tion reporting were higher than those found in pre-
vious studies using data from English practices
(Appendix 2). However, our ID results are not
directly comparable because CDM programme
reporting systems in England do not routinely dif-
ferentiate ID from other exception reporting rea-
sons, and include cases of ‘non-attendance after
three invitations’ as ‘clinical – unsuitable’. Previous
studies have not examined the same indicators over
time, have included data from only one contract
year, have not considered population achievement
or have only examined data prior to 2010 [11, 17,
23, 33, 36], thereby limiting understanding of the
inverse equity hypothesis in recent years of the UK
CDM system.
Prior to the 2005 longitudinal study by Campbell
et al. [72] and following the introduction of the
incentivised CDM programme [11], analysis of
practice-level data showed that the socioeconomic
gradient in care quality narrowed, as anticipated by
the inverse equity hypothesis [37]. However, studies
used practice-level reported achievement without
considering time trends in ID, overall exceptions or
population achievement [10, 11, 38, 72]. Therefore,
previous results may have masked underlying inequi-
ties [34].
Our practice-level findings are supported by
patient-level data from other studies, which have
suggested worsening of health disparities under the
CDM contract through the exclusion of already
disadvantaged groups, such as ethnic minorities
with diabetes [73], patients with co-morbidities
[32], and those at higher risk of diabetes complica-
tions [26, 74].
By using longitudinal data containing practice-level
ID and overall exceptions together with population
achievement, our study addresses calls from a recent
systematic review [34] and adds further weight to
emerging evidence that the incentivised system for
CDM in the UK has not diminished inequalities [33,
34, 75]. More research is needed to explore the
typology and engagement patterns of patients who
are serially not engaging in incentivised CDM
programmes so that approaches to engagement can
be individualised.
Conclusions
Overall and ID exception reporting rates have in-
creased in Scotland. Rates of exception reporting in-
cluding ID are higher in practices receiving higher
remuneration, which may reflect practices being more
adept at detecting and recording exceptions to avoid
missing out on payments. Overall and ID exception
reporting is higher in practices with greater numbers
of patients from socioeconomically deprived areas. If,
as would seem likely, ID rates represent non-
engagement with CDM appointments, this would
imply that ‘hard to reach’ patients are receiving sub-
optimal care. These results suggest there are widening
socioeconomic and other inequalities and confound
the inverse equity hypothesis. The CDM scheme is
unlikely to be an example of a truly equitable public
health intervention, suggesting a need for policy-
makers who are currently revising the scheme, or
others contemplating such schemes in other coun-
tries, to consider including incentives for engaging
with the 'hard to reach' who are most at risk of ad-
verse outcomes if reducing health inequalities is
deemed important.
Appendix 1
Table 6 Distribution of predictor variables in 2010/2011
Variable Cut -offs Number of practices
(2010/2011)
Practice population:
% in top 15% most
deprived
None
<5%
5–15%
15–25%
25–50%
>50%
136
191
128
116
151
71
Practice population:
mean age
<40
40–41
≥42
240
289
264
Practice population:
list size
<5000
5–10,000
≥10,000
389
333
71
Practice population:
patients per GP
<1000
1000–1500
≥1500
289
327
177
Practice GPs:
number of GPs
1
2–3
4–6
≥7
48
262
268
215
Practice GPs:
mean age
≤44
45–49
≥50
265
312
216
Practice:
urban/rural
Large urban
Other urban
Small town
Rural
315
211
103
164
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Table 7 Comparison with previous studies describing practice-level exception reporting
Author, year This paper Doran et al. 2006 [17] Doran et al. 2008 [11] Doran et al. 2012 [23]
Contract year 2010–2013 2004/2005 2005/2006 2008/2009
Country Scotland England England England
Design and data source Regression; National QOF Regression; National QOF Regression; National QOF Regression; National QOF
Number of practices 793 8105 7629 8229
Practice exclusion criteria Not submitting data for
all included indicators for
each year
<1000 or ≤50% of reported
patients; disease register
missing
<1000 patients;
≥1 missing disease register
or incomplete data
Nil
Indicators (diseases)a 29 (11) 30 (8) 65 (10) 62 (15)
Total exception rate (median (IQR))b 7.0%
(2.6–13.3%)
6.0%
(4.9–7.7%)
5.3%
(0–28.3%)
2.7%
(1.9–3.9%)
Informed dissent exception rate
(median (IQR))b
0.9% (0.0–3.2%) - - 0.44%
(0.14–1.1%)c
Population achievement (the
proportion of all patients with the
condition for whom QOF targets
were met, including exceptions)
83.5% (75.1–90.7%) 82.9% (77.9–86.3%) 83%
Diseases included Asthma Asthma Atrial fibrillation, asthma
Hypertension Hypertension Hypertension,
cancer
Hypertension,
cancer
CHD CHD CHD CHD
COPD COPD COPD Heart failure
CKD CKD
Dementia Dementia
Depression Depression
Diabetes Diabetes Diabetes Diabetes
Epilepsy Epilepsy Epilepsy
Primary prevention Mental illness Mental illness Mental illness, smoking
Stroke/TIA Stroke/TIA Stroke/TIA Stroke
Hypothyroidism Hypothyroidism Hypothyroidism Hypothyroidism
a The QOF had 19 domains in 2004
b Proportion of eligible patients
c subset of 37 indicators as the median (range)
CHD coronary heart disease, CKD chronic kidney disease, COPD chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, PP primary prevention of heart disease, QOF Quality and
Outcomes Framework, TIA transient ischaemic attack
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